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THE LAST STRAW: THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S
PRIVILEGE WAIVER POLICY AND THE DEATH
OF ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE IN CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS OF CORPORATIONS
Julie R. O'Sullivan*
INTRODUCTION
The white-collar criminal defense bar has never been reticent to
complain about U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) policies that
threaten its clients or the viability of its practice. But nothing-at
least in the author's twenty-plus years of involvement in white-collar
issues-has consumed the bar as much as the threats posed to the
corporate attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine.' While
commentators have identified a variety of assaults on these protec-
tions,2 the bar is most vocally outraged by the DOJ policy, pursuant to
which, it charges, federal prosecutors regularly insist that corporations
waive these protections to secure cooperation credit, declination of
criminal action against the corporate actor, and consideration at sen-
tencing.3 For some time now, the defense objections to this particular
* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank my friends in prac-
tice for their insights and corrections (all mistakes and misjudgments remain my own), my
friends in academe for their excellent comments, and my students for everything.
1. See, e.g., Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement's Multi-Front
Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege (And Why It Is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469 (2003):
David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death of
Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147 (2000). See also Am.
College of Trial Lawyers, The Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doc-
trine in Federal Criminal Investigations, 41 Duo. L. REV. 307 (2003); Counsel Group Assails
Prosecution Policy Compelling Corporations to Waive Privileges, 67 CRIM. L. REP. 391 (2000);
Joseph F. Savage, Jr. & Melissa M. Longo, 'Waive' Goodbye to Attorney-Client Privilege, 7 Bus.
CRIMES BULL.. Oct. 2000, at 1; Breckinridge L. Willcox, Attorney/Client Privilege Waiver:
Wrongheaded Practice?, 6 Bus. CRIMES BULL., Jan. 2000, at 1.
2. See Cole, supra note 1; Counsel Group Assails Prosecution Policy Compelling Corporations
to Waive Privileges, supra note 1.
3. See Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, U.S. Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads of Dep't Com-
ponents & U.S. Att'ys (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mc-
nulty-memo.pdf [hereinafter McNulty Memo]; Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy
Att'y Gen., to Heads of Dep't Components & U.S. Att'ys (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm [hereinafter Thompson Memo], Memorandum
from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att'y General, to Heads of Dep't Components & U.S. Att'ys
(June 16, 1999), reprinted in Justice Department Guidance on Prosecution of Corporations, 66
CRIM. L. REP. 189 (1999) [hereinafter Holder Memo].
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policy have been unusually sustained, widespread, and passionate.
Until recently, few outside the DOJ have questioned the bona fides of
these objections. 4
The defense bar's call to arms has been joined by heretofore strange
bedfellows, including the ACLU, Chamber of Commerce, and Associ-
ation of Corporate Council.5 This alliance has been successful in pur-
suing its cause, for example, by securing the deletion from the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines of a reference to privilege waivers in the con-
text of assessing corporate cooperation efforts.6 More importantly,
the defense bar and its allies were able to get the attention of some in
Congress, who proposed "fixing" the problem through legislation that
would bar federal prosecutors from considering corporate privilege
waivers when deciding whether to bring criminal or civil charges.7
The DOJ, eager to avoid a congressional "fix," responded by issuing a
revised policy under the name of Deputy Attorney General Paul J.
McNulty. 8
The McNulty Memo contemplates requests for waivers of the cor-
porate attorney-client privilege and work-product protection, but re-
quires prosecutors to weigh identified factors before requesting
waivers, details the types of materials that may be requested, and
mandates that requests be considered-and, in some cases, ap-
4. See, e.g., Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A
Response to the Compelled- Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 897, 897-900 (2006);
Daniel Richman, Decisions About Coercion: The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver
Problem, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 295 (2008).
5. Jason McLure. The Life and Death of the Thompson Memo. LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 18,2006, at
14.
6. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N. AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 45 (May 18,
2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2006guid/FinalUserFrdly.pdf (eliminating final sentence
of Application Note 12 to § 8C2.5, which stated that "[w]aiver of attorney-client privilege and of
work product protections is not a prerequisite to a reduction in culpability score ... unless such
waiver is necessary in order to provide timely and thorough disclosure of all pertinent informa-
tion known to the organization").
7. See McLure. supra note 5 (discussing the proposed Attorney-Client Privilege Protection
Act of 2006). See also Letter from Jerry E. Smith, Chair Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to
David F. Levi. Chair Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (May 15, 2006). http://
www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EVO5-2006.pdf. The committee proposed the following lan-
guage as FED. R. EVID. 502(c):
In a federal or state proceeding, a disclosure of a communication or information cov-
ered by the attorney-client or work product protection-when made to a federal public
office or agency in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement author-
ity-does not operate as a waiver of the privilege or protection in favor of non-govern-
mental persons or entities.
Id.
8. McLure, supra note 5. at 14.
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proved-at the highest levels of Main Justice.9 It is not yet clear
whether the DOJ's efforts will successfully forestall congressional ac-
tion. The post-McNulty Memo introduction of a bill barring federal
prosecutors from requesting privilege waivers or conditioning lenient
treatment on disclosure of privileged information does not bode well
for the DOJ.l° While the bar may eventually be satisfied with this
olive branch, the early returns are not hopeful." For example, the
Memo was barely posted before American Bar Association President
Karen J. Mathis issued a press release stating that these guidelines
"fall far short of what is needed to prevent further erosion of . . .
fundamental attorney-client privilege, work product, and employee
protections during government investigations." 12
Why has this issue energized the corporate defense bar as never
before and seemingly resonated with the judicial and political estab-
lishments? At the outset, let me state what I do not think is going on.
The rationale most often used to explain the bar's aversion to the
DOJ's compelled-voluntary waiver policy is that it undermines the
policies underlying the attorney-client privilege and work-product
9. See McNulty Memo, supra note 3: see also Julie R. O'Sullivan, Does the DOJ's Privilege
Waiver Policy Threaten the Rationales Underlying the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Prod-
uct Doctrine? A Preliminary "No," (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
10. See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong. (2007) (prohibit-
ing government agents from requesting or demanding disclosure of privileged material or condi-
tioning leniency on privilege waivers).
11. See also Brown, Jr., supra note 4, at 907 ("Though well-intended and understandable . ..
the DOJ's mandate for greater scrutiny of waiver requests ... is [not] likely to move the com-
pelled-voluntary waiver discussion towards a meaningful resolution."). Some practitioners seem
cautiously hopeful. See, e.g., David Z. Seide, Department of Justice McNulty Memo Curtails
Controversial Portions of Thompson Memo-Legislation Introduced in the Senate (Dec. 13,
2006), available at http://www.wilmerhale.com/publicationslwhPubsDetail.aspx?publica (noting
that, "[als a practical matter, the Memorandum is likely to substantially curtail privilege waiver
demands from line prosecutors" principally by placing "what appear to be meaningful hurdles
[such as DOJ approval requirements] in the path of any line prosecutor bent on making such
demands"). In the main, however, they identify potentially significant problems with the revised
policy. See, e.g., Richard Ben-Veniste & Raj De, The "McNulty Memo": A Missed Opportunity
to Reverse Erosion of Attorney-Client Privilege. 22 LEGAL_ BACKGROUNDER, Jan. 19. 2007, at 1:
Abbe D. Lowell et al., Is the DOJ's New Policy on Prosecuting Corporations Real Reform or
Business as Usual? (Jan. 31, 2007), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/whitecollar/
wcnews069?Open.
12. The McNulty Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate Investigations:
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, I 10th Cong. 11-12 (2007) (Statement of Karen J. Mathis, President, ABA), available
at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/attyclient/2007marO8-privwaivh-t.pdf [hereinafter
Mathis Statement]: Margaret Aulino. House Subcommittee Wants to Bolster Means to Combat
Forced Waiver of Privilege (Mar. 9, 2007), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/whitecol-
lar/wcnews072?OpenDocument; McLure, supra note 5.
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doctrine. 13 Rather than rehashing previous efforts to analyze this is-
sue, I will simply summarize my earlier findings: (1) the attorney-cli-
ent privilege is not necessary to ensure that public corporations
continue conducting competent internal investigations when allega-
tions of wrongdoing arise; and (2) the corporate privilege is not effec-
tive in inducing rational employees to disclose to corporate counsel
information that they otherwise would not. 14
Public. corporations essentially have no choice but to investigate
when confronted with possible corporate malfeasance. Internal inves-
tigations certainly have their costs, but, given the imperatives created
by statutory, regulatory, prosecutorial, sentencing, civil liability, and
corporate law pressures, "the internal investigation has become the
standard of care whenever credible allegations of significant miscon-
duct are raised in organizational settings. ' 15 Corporations, then, have
compelling incentives to investigate allegations of potential criminal
wrongdoing, whether or not the attorney-client privilege will ulti-
mately shield the facts revealed by their investigative efforts.
Some object that, if work-product waivers are encouraged, corpo-
rate counsel will respond by compromising the depth or quality of
their investigation. In particular, counsel will refuse to record incrimi-
nating evidence. However, given the dynamics of internal corporate
investigations and the regulatory environment, this author does not
think that competent lawyers will compromise the quality of either
their investigations or their eventual advice to clients because of the
potential for government-induced privilege waivers. First, serious cor-
13. See, e.g., Mathis Statement, supra note 12, at 8, 14-15; see also supra note I and accompa-
nying text.
14. O'Sullivan, supra note 9.
15. Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professionalism
and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 859, 886; accord Timothy J. Coleman &
Christine Y. Chi, Internal Investigations: Who, What, When, Why and How, in ADVANCED COR-
PORATE COMPLIANCE WORKSHIP 2006 265, 272-73 (Practising L. Inst. 2006); Nancy Kestenbaum
& Jason P. Criss, Credit Where Credit is Due? The Role ofInternal Investigations in the Outcome
of Government Investigations, in INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS: LEGAL, ETHICAL & STRATEGIC
ISsUES 2006 121, 151-52 (Practising L. Inst. 2006); Aaron R. Marcu, Investigating Indications of
Wrongdoing: Necessary and Proper in the Post-Enron Era, in INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS: LE-
GAL, ETHICAL & STRATEGIC ISSUES 2006 199, 202-03 (2006); O'Sullivan, supra note 9: A. Red-
ing & Edward Han, The Horns of a Dilemma: Coerced Waivers in the Name of "Cooperation," in
SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2006 445, 450-51 (Practising L. Inst. 2006):
John Jeffrey Thomas & Susan T. Stead, Attorney-Client Privilege and Confidentiality Issues in
Internal and External Investigations, 35 THE BRIEF 12 (Summer 2006); Kenneth B. Winer et al..
Internal Investigations and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, in THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRAC-
TICES Acr: COPING WITH HEIGHTENED ENFORCEMENT RISKS 286, 296-303 (Practising L. Inst.
2007); Marjorie J. Peerce & Peggy M. Cross, Independent Corporate Investigations, 14 Bus.
CRIMES BULL., Jan. 2007, at 1. For advice on the conduct of internal investigations, see DAN K.
WEBB ET AL., CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS (2007).
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porate investigations require papering; if counsel decides not to write
down facts she finds troubling to the corporation, she is necessarily
going to do a shoddy job. Counsel needs all the facts to adequately
advise the client, and ignoring certain facts will necessarily disserve
the client. In addition to compromising the quality of counsel's ad-
vice, such actions would more generally run contrary to the entity's
interests.
Criminal prosecutors are certainly one audience for internal investi-
gations, but far from the only, or even the most crucial. In fact, one of
the "primary goals in retaining investigatory counsel is to conduct a
fair, thorough and complete investigation so [companies] can assure
investors, regulators and employees that [they have] discovered the
extent of any problems that exist and [have] a plan not only to correct
them but to prevent their recurrence."' 6 Marjorie Peerce and Peggy
Cross have further explained this goal:
Whether the company succeeds in providing these assurances de-
pends in significant part on the degree of confidence these groups
have in the outside counsel conducting the investigation. One thing
is certain: unless they trust that the investigation was truly an inde-
pendent one, they are not likely to have faith in the outcome. Such
a lack of faith can have devastating consequences for the company:
valuable employees distrustful of management may leave, investors
may pull their support, and regulators may disregard the results of
the internal investigation and decide to conduct their own, dis-
rupting the company and further undermining the investing public's
faith in it. And if regulators feel that the investigation was deliber-
ately compromised by the lack of independence, they may decide to
investigate the company and its senior management further.17
Accordingly, some practitioners, far from cautioning counsel to stop
taking notes of potentially inculpatory statements made in witness in-
terviews, actually stress that such material must be included in the fi-
nal report counsel renders to the entity's board, because "[i]f the
company decides to disclose the report to the Government a report
that presents the incriminating evidence as well as the exculpatory evi-
dence is more likely to be credited by law enforcement officials; gov-
ernment officials are likely to discount a report that ignores
incriminating evidence." '
The report will also be ignored, or worse, by the other regulatory
and business constituencies noted above. In the eyes of prosecutors, a
selective, biased, or sloppy investigative effort is worse than no effort
16. Peerce & Cross, supra note 15, at 6.
17. Id.
18. Winer et al.. supra note 15, at 334.
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at all, because the government is likely to view it as a whitewash, an
attempt to protect management, or, at worst, an actionable obstruc-
tion. If it is in the corporate client's best interest to investigate-as it
will almost always be-it will also be in the entity's best interest that
the investigation is unbiased, fair, and thorough.' 9
Finally, the existence of a privilege owned by the corporation does
not create incentives for the rational employee to share information
with corporate counsel that she otherwise would not. Some employees
will provide corporate counsel with the details of their wrongdoing
even after being given the so-called Upjohn warning informing them
that counsel does not represent them and that the corporation owns
the privilege shielding their conversation. 20 But those employees' ir-
rational choices certainly cannot be attributed to the existence of a
corporate attorney-client privilege; rather, it is likely precipitated by
corporate threats to fire uncooperative employees. Indeed, to the ex-
tent that the extension of the corporate privilege to these circum-
stances carries an obligation to warn the witness that she does not own
or control the privilege and that her statement is confidential only so
long as the corporation wants it to be, the privilege may actually in-
hibit fulsome communication.
If privilege waivers do not unduly undermine the rationales for the
attorney-client privilege and work-product protection, why is the bar
so distraught? There are, no doubt, a complex of factors, some of
them self-interested, that contribute to this phenomenon. But, after
numerous conferences, discussions, and informal talks with white-col-
lar practitioners, my sense of the predominant "why" of this is difficult
to footnote but very clear: these advocates are genuinely outraged by
the feeling that the government has stepped over the line and made it
virtually impossible for them to function as defenders of corporate
clients in an adversarial confrontation with the government.
This Article's thesis turns on a circumstance that is rarely raised in
this debate, but which is central to it: collective entities, such as cor-
porations, cannot claim the Fifth Amendment right against self-in-
crimination. The attorney-client privilege and the work-product
doctrine are critical, not because they encourage self-correction or
candid communication between corporate client and counsel, but
19. Also, to the extent that the bar asserts that any uncertainty with respect to the applicabil-
ity of the privilege will impair counsel's willingness to record information adverse to the com-
pany, such uncertainty exists in spades without reference to the DOJ policy. See, e.g.,
O'Sullivan, supra note 9.
20. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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rather because they serve as a substitute for the Fifth Amendment in
criminal investigations of corporations in two senses.
First, from a systemic point of view, the lack of a Fifth Amendment
privilege strips a company of the only weapon it has in the preindict-
ment stage to counterbalance the weighty advantages the government
enjoys at that point: the power to refuse to provide evidence that will
be a link in the chain to its own conviction. Second, and more con-
cretely, these protections are the only means by which corporations,
deprived of any privilege against self-incrimination, may shield from
government scrutiny that which the government truly wants and often
needs to make its case: the informed conclusions of counsel regarding
what records are relevant and the witness statements to which counsel
will be privy. Demands for this analytical and evidentiary material-
in effect, in many cases, a roadmap for liability-force counsel not
only to lay her client open for the government, but also to be the
engineer of the case against it. Counsel's ultimate aim, of course, is to
persuade the government that such extraordinary efforts warrant a
declination of prosecution.
Practitioners do not analyze the waiver issue in these terms, but the
general objections contained in some of their literature are entirely
consistent with this thesis. In particular, two related themes emerge
from a survey of practitioners' writings on this and related issues.
First, practitioners seem to object to the pervasive presuppositions un-
derlying the DOJ's policy-and the policies of a wide array of federal
institutions-that corporations have duties not visited upon individu-
als to self-report potential wrongdoing within the company, cooperate
fully with government investigators, remedy any damage, and act ag-
gressively to prevent recurrence of the objectionable behavior.21 The
assumption is that the proper role of corporations confronted with al-
legations of wrongdoing is, quite simply, to roll over. Individual de-
fendants can fight like hell, but corporations should self-report,
remediate harm, cooperate fully, and take whatever prosecutors and
regulators believe they have coming. Zealous defense counsel find
this assumption beyond galling.
The second theme resonating throughout the literature flows from
the first. The bar argues that the waiver policy essentially "deputizes"
corporate counsel in furtherance of this "crime-fighting partnership"
between corporate America and the government. By definition, the
reigning conception of what corporations ought to do when con-
21. See, e.g., George Ellard, Making the Silent Speak and the Informed Wary, 42 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 985 (2005); Lawrence D. Finder, Internal Investigations: Consequences of the Federal
Deputization of Corporate America, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 111 (2003).
20081
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fronted with allegations of criminal wrongdoing means that counsel
are no longer conceived of as the corporation's champions, poised to
defend their clients in an adversarial joust. Rather, they are simply
functionaries charged with exposing whatever wrongdoing has oc-
curred, and advocates only in trying to convince the government to
take the least-damaging avenue-such as regulatory sanction rather
than criminal prosecution-in response to whatever is uncovered. In
short, zealous advocates feel that they have become junior g-men, and
they hate it.
What prevents corporate counsel and their clients from simply say-
ing "no" to this new paradigm? The answer is that they would if they
could, but a variety of circumstances make such choices exceedingly
difficult. The same coercive forces that make the adversary system a
myth in the context of corporate criminal liability also take away the
bargaining leverage of corporations in attempting to resist DOJ privi-
lege waiver "requests." These circumstances, examined in Part II, in-
clude the malleable nature of the federal criminal code, the overbroad
standards of corporate criminal liability, and the range and harshness
of sanctions applicable upon conviction. The DOJ and other regula-
tors could talk about "crime-fighting partnerships with corporate
America" 22 all they wish and could attempt to "deputize" defense
counsel to work on their behalf, but, absent these circumstances, the
defense could quite simply say "no" or "prove it," as is at least their
hypothetical privilege in an adversary system. Given the existence of
these coercive factors, however, counsel have few options in resisting
government inquiries.
This Article provides some context for these themes and explains
more completely why "requests" for waiver of a corporation's attor-
ney-client privilege and work-product doctrine are viewed both as vir-
tually irresistible and as the critical "tipping point" in both the balance
of power between the government and the defense and the eviscera-
tion of defense counsel's role. To mix metaphors, the coercive factors
mentioned above are the lever that DOJ prosecutors and other gov-
ernment agents have used to move the corporate boulder up to the
precipice overlooking the Sea of Complete Capitulation. Once the
22. See, e.g., John F. Savarese & David B. Anders, DOJ Adopts Revised Policies on Corporate
Prosecutions (Dec. 13, 2006), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/
wachtell121306.pdf. The McNulty Memo does not "[change] the fundamental principle that cor-
porations are liable, in virtually all cases, for criminal misconduct by their employees. Thus,
prosecutors will continue to have enormous leverage over corporations and corporations will, in
turn, continue to have powerful incentives to try to appear as cooperative as possible to prosecu-
tors." Id.
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"last straw" of privilege waivers is laid on, the lever sends the boulder
over the cliff to be smothered in that Sea.
Next, this Article asks whether the DOJ's policy is unwise, because
it is the last straw in destroying corporations' claims to adversary pro-
cess in criminal proceedings. Here, it is worth revisiting Hale v. Hen-
kel-the case in which the Supreme Court effectively denied
corporations a Fifth Amendment right-to determine whether that
holding supports the proposition that "legal" persons ought to be
treated differently than "natural" persons in terms of their entitlement
to criminal process.2 3 The examination of Hale in Part III reveals,
however, that the Court's decision was primarily driven by practical
exigency. Far from adopting a conception of corporations as "per-
sons" not entitled to adversary process, the Court actually employed a
completely schizophrenic approach. Critics are left, then, with the
question of public policy.
The DOJ would argue that it can, and should, do everything possi-
ble to quickly and efficiently nip corporate crime in the bud and that
corporate cooperation in this regard, through waivers of privilege and
other means, is in the best interests of the public, as well as the entity
and its shareholders. Prosecutors' positions are not irrational. Corpo-
rate crime can be exceedingly costly to society-whether that cost is
assessed in financial terms, as collateral damage (for example, to the
environment or to public safety), or by reference to public confidence
in markets, financial institutions, and the like. Viewed from the per-
spective of punishing and deterring corporate crime through the most
efficient and effective allocation of government resources, a "crime-
fighting partnership" between the government and corporate America
makes sense, as does enlistment of experienced corporate counsel as
investigating arms of the government.
The only problem is that a similar balancing could be made for rap-
ists, drug dealers, and murderers. Individual defendants' rights to re-
sist the government to the bitter end are also costly and
counterproductive measured by law enforcement imperatives. Yet the
government has not structured its policies, at least as explicitly or
comprehensively, with the clear expectation that individuals are
wrong or irrational to stand on their rights. The assumption that cor-
porations should engage in a "crime-fighting partnership" with the
government, even if it means criminal prosecution and hefty penalties,
is such a constant that its foundation is rarely, if ever, examined. But
it does require justification, and I have not heard a convincing one.
23. 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906).
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The bulk of this Article lays a foundation for further conversations
in which the central concern is not the symptom-the DOJ's waiver
policy-but rather the underlying malady-the circumstances that
conspire to rob organizational defendants of the benefits of the adver-
sarial system-and the fallout from that reality. It is beyond the scope
of this Article to contribute much to the debate over whether corpora-
tions, as "legal" rather than "natural" persons, should have abbrevi-
ated rights in criminal cases, but it will essay a few thoughts to start
the conversation. As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that,
if society truly believes that the adversary system is the best and fair-
est way to test criminal charges when individuals are in the govern-
ment's cross-hairs, it is not at all clear why legal entities such as
corporations should be denied its benefits. Further, society has obvi-
ous and significant-even if rarely articulated-interests in redressing
the existing imbalance of power or at least providing corporations
with some process by which to have prosecutorial theories and
charges reviewed. As noted briefly in Part IV, regardless of how one
conceptualizes corporations in terms of traditional models of justice,
the status quo-in which organizational defendants have the protec-
tions of neither adversarial justice nor the bureaucratic safeguards of
the inquisitorial system-is unacceptable, because not every theory of
prosecution is valid and not every corporate subject deserves criminal
sanction. That being the case, the DOJ could at least ameliorate the
"justice" imbalance by reconsidering its "compelled-voluntary"
waiver policy.
II. THE OBSTACLES THE CORPORATION FACES IN RESISTING
GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS
A. The Coercive Circumstances Operating on Corporate Subjects in
Criminal Investigations
It is exceedingly difficult to conceive of the criminal process that
applies to corporations today as truly "adversarial." In reality, a vari-
ety of circumstances make it nearly impossible for public companies,
especially those in regulated industries or those who do significant
business with the government, to mount any meaningful resistance to
a criminal investigation. These factors certainly make resisting privi-
lege waiver "requests" very hard.
To begin, under the federal code and regulations, the crimes that
can be charged in white-collar cases are virtually limitless and shock-
[Vol. 57:329
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ingly malleable. 24 The breadth and flexibility of the criminal code al-
lows prosecutors to charge the corporation for something in almost
any case in which any arguable skulduggery is uncovered. Further,
the exposure of corporations to criminal sanction is even more exten-
sive than it is for individuals, because corporations, unlike many indi-
viduals, are subject to a vast array of federal regulations. It is a
shocking fact that no one has been able to come up with an accurate
count of the number of criminal statutes on the books, let alone the
number of criminalized regulations.2 5 Some commentators, however,
have posited that there may be as many as 300,000 federal regulations
subject to criminal enforcement. 26 Corporations are more vulnerable
than individuals for another reason:
The black-letter law of corporate criminal liability is straightfor-
ward: a corporation is liable for the criminal misdeeds of its agents
acting within the actual or apparent scope of their employment or
authority if the agents intend, at least in part, to benefit the corpora-
tion, even though their actions may be contrary to corporate policy
or express corporate order.2 7
The extremely broad, judicially created standards for corporate crimi-
nal liability mean that virtually anything that a corporate agent does
can be imputed to the corporation and thus result in the organization's
criminal conviction. 28 This respondeat superior standard has been ex-
tended to apply in situations where no one actor's conduct and mens
rea can be imputed to the corporation. 29 Indeed, corporations can be
criminally liable even when no one agent did anything illegal under
the "collective knowledge" and "flagrant organizational indifference"
theories, which augment the already over-broad respondeat superior
standards.30
24. I begin my white-collar crime class each year by assuring my eighty-odd students that I
could indict them all for something and then proceeding to horrify those law-abiding citizens by
demonstrating why that is indeed so.
25. See, e.g., Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Federal Criminal "Code" Is a Disgrace: Obstruction
Statutes as Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 648-50 (2006).
26. Id. at 649.
27. JULIE R. O'SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS 161-62
(3d ed. 2007): accord N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909);
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 138 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1998), affd on other grounds,
526 U.S. 398 (1999); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972).
28. See, e.g., Sun-Diamond Growers, 138 F.3d 961; Jennifer Moore, Corporate Culpability
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 743, 759 (1992).
29. For example, a corporation's criminal liability has been upheld where one employee har-
bored the requisite mens rea while another performed the actus reus, and where a corporation
was convicted but all conceivable individuals were acquitted. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Corporate
Criminal Responsibility, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 253, 255-56 (Sanford H. Kad-
ish ed., 1983).
30. United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 855 (1st Cir. 1987).
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Even were a corporation to conclude that it has a shot at defending
itself against a particular charge or theory of liability, one must recog-
nize that its calculus regarding whether to resist a government investi-
gation is hugely affected by the number, range, and seriousness of the
sanctions available should it fail in that effort. The array of penalties
to which convicted corporations may be subject is extensive and oner-
ous. Although not every conviction is in essence a corporate death
sentence-as was the case in the obstruction prosecution of Arthur
Andersen LLP-the company will certainly take a pronounced
pounding in a variety of ways: (1) the restitution, fine, and corporate
probation obligations under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines appli-
cable to organizations;31 (2) potential debarment from government
contracting; (3) possibly ruinous regulatory or licensing repercussions;
(4) loss of employees, customers, and financing; and (5) the applica-
tion of collateral estoppel to foreclose the entity from resisting the
civil damages demands of any number of potential private plaintiffs.
Corporations, unlike most individuals, will take a hard look at their
bottom line and often decide that, whether or not their guilt is contest-
able, they have no choice but to cooperate fully with the government
in hopes of avoiding the financial train wreck of a criminal conviction.
This dynamic is reinforced by the incentives recent legislation and de-
velopments in corporate law have created for corporate boards-and
particularly the increasingly powerful independent directors in the
post-Enron era-to protect themselves against civil liability by rolling
over whenever prosecutors come calling.
The above dynamic, peculiar to corporate crime cases, is com-
pounded by the general inequality in arms between the government
and persons subject to criminal investigation. The government has at
its disposal some serious artillery. Subject to constitutional and other
legal restraints, it can make arrests, search and seize private property,
conduct surveillance in person and by wiretap, and call out all of the
human, analytical, and technical resources of investigating agencies.
Prosecutors can, by statute, override individuals' right to remain silent
and, by statute or contract, enter into cooperation agreements by
which testimony is secured by grant of immunity, dismissal of charges,
sentencing discounts, or other valuable consideration. The govern-
ment can force defendants to produce records and witnesses to testify
through grand jury subpoenas. If that which is subpoenaed is not
forthcoming, the government can ask that the contemnors be jailed
until they comply. It can promise "things of value" for witnesses'
31. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL 474-518 (2007).
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help,32 threaten to indict their families members, 33 and, in some cir-
cumstances, lie to get what it wants.
By contrast, those under investigation have no Sixth Amendment
right to counsel until formal proceedings are launched against them. 34
Even the Fifth Amendment right to counsel created in Miranda does
not apply outside of the narrow context of custodial interrogations by
known government actors. 35 Subjects and targets are not entitled to
any sort of pre-indictment discovery;36 indeed, were they to attempt to
find out what the grand jury is doing, they may well face obstruction
charges. 37 The law also prohibits them from providing witnesses with
any consideration in return for testimony, even for cooperation and
truthful stories. 38 Threats or lies by the subjects or targets of investi-
gations, in many circumstances, could lead to criminal sanction. 39 Ad-
ditionally, there is no legal process in the criminal system through
which putative defendants can compel third parties to give them any
sort of assistance in identifying the relevant facts or in trying to fend
off an indictment.40
What does the adversary process provide subjects and targets of
criminal investigations to even this imbalance? The sole real counter-
weight, at the investigative stage at least, is the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. It is this privilege that gives indi-
viduals the right to resist through silence-the right to not cooperate
in one's own undoing. The Supreme Court has provided us with many
rationales for the privilege against self-incrimination, many of which
are grounded in conceptions of human dignity that do not apply com-
fortably to impersonal entities.41 The Fifth Amendment value that is
32. United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(c)(2) does not apply to the United States or an Assistant U.S. Attorney functioning within
the official scope of her office).
33. See, e.g., Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459, 1469 (10th Cir. 1995).
34. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977).
35. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291
(1980).
36. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; O'SULLIVAN, supra note 27, at 801-39.
37. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000).
38. See id. § 201(c).
39. See id. § 1512(b).
40. See, e.g., O'SULLIVAN, supra note 27, at 801-39.
41. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). In Murphy, the Court provided
the following explanations:
The privilege against self-incrimination "registers an important advance in the develop-
ment of our liberty-'one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself
civilized."' It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our
unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusa-
tion, perjury or contempt; ... our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited
by inhumane treatment and abuses ... ; our respect for the inviolability of the human
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critical for this Article's purposes, however, is that which deals with
the balance of power between the hunter and the hunted. As the Su-
preme Court explained, in part, in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,
the privilege reflects several values:
[O]ur preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial sys-
tem of criminal justice; . . . [and] our sense of fair play which dic-
tates "a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to
leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing
him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individ-
ual to shoulder the entire load." 42
Even this counterweight is denied to corporate subjects or targets of
government inquiries. In Hale v. Henkel, the Supreme Court held
that corporations cannot, through their agents, assert a Fifth Amend-
ment right against self-incrimination to resist the production of corpo-
rate books and records. 43 Nor can corporate agents claim their own,
personal Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when they
are compelled to produce corporate records in their capacity as corpo-
rate agents.44
B. Counsel's Role in Corporate Criminal Defense
This Section examines how corporate defense counsel operate in an
environment that is heavily weighted in favor of the government. Two
points are worth emphasis at the outset. First, because of the above-
described consequences of a criminal charge, white-collar practition-
ers will do everything in their power to secure a disposition short of
criminal indictment and, ideally, a declination from the DOJ. Most
white-collar cases are viewed as won or lost in this pre-indictment
phase. Second, during this phase, there are at least four challenges
facing defense counsel: (1) divining what the government is investi-
gating without the benefit of formal discovery or other means of com-
pelling the production of most types of information; (2) tracing or,
personality and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead
a private life[ I": our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that
the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the
innocent."
Id. (internal citations omitted); cf. Norman M. Garland, The Unavailability to Corporations of
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Comparative Examination, 16 N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 55, 58 (1996) (noting that the High Court of Australia does not accord corporations a
privilege against self-incrimination and supports this ruling "with a policy pronouncement that
the privilege against self-incrimination is truly based only on the desire to prevent torture and
other inhumane treatment of human beings").
42. 378 U.S. at 55 (citation omitted).
43. 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906).
44. See, e.g.. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
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with luck, keeping a step ahead of the government in learning the
facts; (3) limiting, consistent with ethical and legal constraints, govern-
ment access to incriminating evidence; and (4) using the facts, law,
and equitable arguments to persuade the government to decline pros-
ecution. As the above outline reveals, information control is the cen-
tral function of the defense enterprise. 45
Without a Fifth Amendment right, how can this central function be
achieved? This Article argues that the means that corporate counsel
use to pursue this "fundamental modus operandi constituting [the] ba-
sic defense plan" is to shield, to the extent possible, their work in in-
vestigating and documenting corporate wrongdoing by invoking the
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine. 46 Thus, when the
government seeks to force the waiver of these protections, it essen-
tially takes away the last, and virtually only, weapon that corporate
counsel have to control information and resist the government.
Let us test this theory by reference to what most corporate counsel
actually do when, as is almost de rigueur these days, they respond to
allegations of corporate wrongdoing by conducting an internal investi-
gation. Corporate counsel will focus on two categories of evidence:
physical or electronic records and statements provided by witnesses.
Either in-house lawyers or, if the matter is particularly sensitive or
high-profile, outside counsel will scour the relevant documents and
computer files and isolate those that they think are relevant. In white-
collar investigations, counsel generally seek letters and emails; memo-
randa; reports; financial data; telephone and banking records; person-
nel, expense account, and travel records; and datebooks. Witness
testimony will often be required to prove the authenticity, or lack
thereof, of such materials; explain how and why they were generated;
and discuss their use or meaning in context. Witnesses will also often
be critical to establish the putative defendants' mens rea-for exam-
ple, in demonstrating that the defendant knew that the inarguably in-
correct figures in a tax return were false or intended to obstruct justice
45. See, e.g., KENNETH MANN. DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF A-TOR-
NEYS AT WORK (1985). Mann notes that, "above all, and this is the central theme of the white-
collar crime defense function, the defense attorney works to keep potential evidence out of gov-
ernment reach by controlling access to information." Id. at 5. He also explains that "[w]hat is
distinctive in white-collar cases is the centrality of information control strategies to defense
work: they are fundamental modus operandi constituting a basic defense plan, rather than
merely tactics in a broader strategy." Id. at 8. One defense lawyer affirmed Mann's thesis: "My
own belief is that the more information you control as [a] defense lawyer, the more effective you
are, meaning that the only weapon you have as a defense lawyer in my view is control of infor-
mation." Id. at 171.
46. Id. at 8.
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by misleading investigators. But the corporate records are vital; they
provide the skeleton upon which a case is built or refuted. They are
also essential reference points that attorneys use to check the credibil-
ity of witness accounts, refresh recollections of those involved, and fill
in the blanks where memory fails. In short, this category of materials
is critical to the construction and defense of a criminal white-collar
case.
If possible, after the document review, corporate counsel will also
seek to interview all relevant agents for the reasons discussed above.
Often, at least at the inception of an inquiry, when the "status" of an
employee is unclear, employees will not have their own counsel.
Before interviewing these employees, however, corporate counsel will
give what are called Upjohn warnings.47 These warnings can take a
number of forms, but often involve the following cautions: (1) the
investigating attorneys represent the entity and not the individual em-
ployee being interviewed; (2) the company's attorney-client privilege
protects the confidentiality of the interview; (3) the company retains
the right to decide whether to reveal to the government or others
outside the company what is said during the interview; and (4) the
company wishes the employees to keep the interview confidential. 48
Employees can choose not to speak to counsel. They may claim their
personal Fifth Amendment rights or simply decline to cooperate.
Many corporations, however, will sanction and often fire those agents
who are unwilling to assist counsel. A company may have such a pol-
icy for a variety of reasons, including the corporation's own interest in
identifying malefactors, remedying the wrongdoing, and preventing
further damage. That said, the DOJ's cooperation policy certainly
gives corporations a compelling incentive to take a hardline with un-
cooperative employees. One observer noted that "[p]rosecutors ...
expect the corporation's lawyers to conduct an investigation for the
government with tools the government does not have, particularly the
threat of firing employees who refuse to provide information. '' 49
C. The Tools for Resistance
1. Corporate Records
The corporation and its agents cannot resist a properly drafted sub-
poena duces tecum requiring the production of corporate books and
47. See, e.g.. Duggin, supra note 15, passim.
48. See id. at 941-47.
49. Programs Examine Trend Toward Seeking Corporate Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege,
71 U.S. L. WK., Apr. 8, 2003, at 2635.
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records on Fifth Amendment grounds. Additionally, Fourth Amend-
ment objections almost always fail. Thus, corporate actors may be
compelled to gather and surrender corporate records through agents
of the corporation, such as those designated as custodians of records.
Counsel's document review is not protected by a corporate Fifth
Amendment right, and a company cannot defend against the produc-
tion of preexisting, unprivileged materials simply based on the fact
that an attorney, in investigating the misconduct alleged or upon re-
ceipt of a subpoena, reviewed the records. 50 But the lawyers' identifi-
cation, selection, and organization of potentially probative documents
is protected work product.5 ' That is, the work-product doctrine and,
in some circumstances, the attorney-client privilege can protect that
which the government truly wants: the work product counsel has gen-
erated after conducting its own review of these records and win-
nowing the warehouses and computers full of potentially relevant
material to a core set of pertinent records.
Are there legitimate reasons, aside from sheer ease, for the govern-
ment to insist on provision of these materials? Certainly having the
results of corporate counsel's document review will save the govern-
ment time and resources. It is also important to note that government
agents lack a variety of advantages corporate counsel have in review-
ing corporate records. What will long remain a black box to prosecu-
tors-the internal workings of the corporation-will likely be laid
bare for the corporation's own investigators. Thus, for example, cor-
porate lawyers can quickly come up to speed on the corporate hierar-
chy, chains of command, culture, standard operating procedures, and
histories and personalities of the principal players, whereas prosecu-
tors will need months, if not years, to achieve the same level of knowl-
edge. Corporate counsel will also have access to people within the
corporation who can quickly point them to the critical documents, in-
terpret those documents, and evaluate their import.
2. Witness Statements
With respect to oral statements, "the corporation" cannot be sub-
poenaed to testify, and its individual agents can assert their own, per-
sonal Fifth Amendment rights. Here, then, the government has a
more obvious need for the assistance of corporate counsel. Corporate
counsel have a number of potential advantages over the government
50. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391. 403-04 (1976); Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining
& Smelting Co., 825 F.2d 676, 679-80 (2d Cir. 1987).
51. See, e.g., Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that an attorney's selection of
documents in preparation for client deposition reflects that attorney's mental impressions).
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in securing the statements of critical witnesses outside of the grand
jury room. The DOJ recognizes this in its cooperation policy:
In investigating wrongdoing by or within a corporation, a prosecu-
tor is likely to encounter several obstacles resulting from the nature
of the corporation itself. It will often be difficult to determine
which individual took which action on behalf of the corporation.
Lines of authority and responsibility may be shared among operat-
ing divisions or departments, and records and personnel may be
spread throughout the United States or even among several coun-
tries. Where the criminal conduct continued over an extended pe-
riod of time, the culpable or knowledgeable personnel may have
been promoted, transferred, or fired, or they may have quit or re-
tired. Accordingly, a corporation's cooperation may be critical in
identifying the culprits .... 52
In short, corporate counsel will have a better chance of locating wit-
nesses before evidence disappears, statutes of limitations run, and wit-
nesses' memories fade.
As noted above, this author does not believe that a rational em-
ployee, with full information and good advice, will freely share self-
incriminating information with corporate counsel that she otherwise
would not share in reliance upon the protections of the corporation's
attorney-client privilege. Because the employee will be told that the
conversation is privileged only so long as the corporation wishes it to
be, self-preservation would counsel silence.53 That said, not all culpa-
ble employees are rational or truly understand the import of Upjohn
warnings. Some employees will be interviewed before they or counsel
realize the extent of their possible exposure, and some may take their
chances in talking-or lying-to counsel, rather than facing the em-
ployment consequences of taking the Fifth. 54 In short, corporate
counsel is likely to have access to at least some witness statements that
the government will not. By the time employees receive a subpoena
demanding their testimony before a grand jury, they will likely have
separate counsel who will strongly advise them that the only rational
course is to take the Fifth if they have any possible criminal exposure.
Further, those corporate employees who do not have personal expo-
sure will probably be more candid and forthcoming with corporate
counsel-not because of the existence of the corporate privilege but
rather out of loyalty to those in trouble or concerns about how ful-
52. Thompson Memo, supra note 3.
53. See O'Sullivan, supra note 9.
54. But cf Julie R. O'Sullivan, The DOJ Risks Killing the Golden Goose Through Computer
Associates/Singleton Theories of Obstruction, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1447 (2007) (discussing the
dynamic facing employees when interviewed in the course of an internal corporate
investigation).
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some cooperation with government investigators will affect their em-
ployer, as well as their personal employment prospects.
Should counsel decide, as is very common, to keep notes or de-
briefing memoranda detailing what witnesses shared with them in the
course of the investigation, these materials are not subject to the Fifth
Amendment shield. If their confidential nature is maintained, how-
ever, such notes and memos may be protected by the attorney-client
privilege, depending upon the forum in which that evidentiary privi-
lege is asserted. 55 Even without the privilege, however, they will be
protected from discovery by the work-product doctrine. 56 Work-prod-
uct protection can, in some cases, be overcome with a sufficient show-
ing of need.57 But, if the corporation's lawyers are careful to sprinkle
their "opinion" throughout the notes, this protection is nearly impreg-
nable, absent a waiver.
In sum, public corporations have virtually no choice but to investi-
gate allegations of wrongdoing. In so doing, they are responding not
just to legal, regulatory, and business imperatives, but also to the ne-
cessity of determining the extent of their criminal exposure and the
course of action that may best avoid such an eventuality. The results
of counsel's investigation, if properly done, will identify relevant evi-
dence, provide insight into likely witness testimony, and evaluate the
legal culpability of the corporation. The corporation cannot claim the
Fifth Amendment to resist government efforts to access inculpatory
evidence, whether it be documents or witness statements. 58 Thus, in
conducting the investigation, corporate counsel will do everything
possible to cover the potentially dangerous fruits of their investigation
with privilege. Absent the protection of the attorney-client privilege
and the work-product doctrine, counsel's work would, in many cases,
give the government and others a blueprint for corporate criminal and
civil liability-a blueprint paid for, in more ways than one, by the
corporation. 59
The DOJ seeks this blueprint, and the facts and work underlying it,
through its waiver "requests." The reason corporations have waived
applicable attorney-client and work-product protections, with or with-
out explicit DOJ "requests," is that most public corporations simply
do not have the bargaining power to withstand a criminal prosecution
55. See, e.g., O'Sullivan, supra note 9 (discussing the Upjohn attorney-client privilege standard
and contrasting it with the narrower tests adopted in some U.S. states and foreign countries).
56. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397-402 (1981).
57. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see also Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 400-02.
58. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906).
59. See O'Sullivan, supra note 9 (discussing the lack of a selective waiver doctrine).
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due to the coercive circumstances outlined above. Putting the govern-
ment to its burden is not even on the table.
III. DID HALE V. HENKEL DENY ADVERSARIAL PROCESS
TO LEGAL "PERSONS"?
The DOJ would, no doubt, note at this point that it did not create
the conditions that make it exceedingly difficult for corporations to
turn down prosecutors' waiver "requests." Prosecutors are not princi-
pally responsible for the dismal state of the federal criminal code;
Congress is the true culprit there. Nor are prosecutors solely respon-
sible for the overbroad -standards controlling corporate criminal liabil-
ity; although they may propose them, it is judges who ultimately
decide what standards to adopt. Finally, prosecutors, again, do not set
the applicable penalties, criminal or civil. Although the executive
branch is responsible for agency-created penalties, such as disbarment,
Congress, the U.S. Sentencing Commission, and a variety of other reg-
ulators and private actors are responsible for the onerous conse-
quences of a corporate criminal conviction. Thus, the DOJ would
likely argue that it is simply pursuing its own entirely legitimate
agenda within the framework created by others.
As a matter of public policy, is this the appropriate position, or
should the DOJ, in the larger interests of justice, forswear exploiting
the current circumstances and abjure waiver requests? The answer to
this question depends on two further queries: first, whether one be-
lieves that the current imbalance between the government and corpo-
rations is good or bad; and second, if it is a bad thing that corporations
are, as is vehemently asserted by the bar, effectively denied the bene-
fits of an adversarial criminal process, what should be done about it?
With respect to the first query-to determine whether corporations
should be able to resist the government's access to incriminating cor-
porate information-it is worthwhile to return to the Supreme Court's
decision in Hale v. Henkel, which denied corporations the benefit of a
privilege against self-incrimination. 60 In revisiting Hale, one might ask
whether the Supreme Court's decision reflected a judgment that cor-
porations are not, in fact, as entitled as "natural" persons to the nor-
mal processes of adversarial criminal justice.
A. Corporate "Personhood"
What is a "corporation"? What does it mean to call a corporation a
legal "person"? These questions emerged as the corporation became
60. 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906).
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a popular form of business organization in the late nineteenth century
and sparked considerable debate into the first part of the twentieth
century. In the late twentieth century, corporate scholars turned to
other subjects. The debate has only recently been resumed. This Ar-
ticle cannot capture that extensive literature in these pages and so will
summarize its broad outlines, with apologies to readers for omitting
the nuances of the debate. 61
During the colonial period and into the nineteenth century, corpo-
rations were relatively rare for two reasons. First, as Professor Hamill
explained, "[i]n the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, few
enterprises other than strictly public organizations needed the legal
benefits offered by the corporation .... The size and level of business
activity had not yet evolved to a point of needing the legal benefits
provided by the corporate form."'62 Second, corporate charters were
available during this period only through political grants; there were
no general incorporation statutes that permitted any willing business-
person to engage in the corporate form.63 During the colonial days,
corporate charters came directly from the King of England or, later,
through grants of colonial assemblies. 64
After independence, state legislatures chartered each corporation
by special act. 65 Incorporation was viewed as a limited privilege flow-
ing from explicit and specific state sanction, and the vast majority of
corporate charters were issued for public purposes, such as building
bridges or roads. 66 As a factual matter, then, the corporation was con-
ceived of as "the creation of the legislature, owing its existence to
state action, rather than to the acts of the shareholder-incorpora-
tors, '' 67 and engaging essentially in public functions. This conception
is called the "artificial entity theory" and finds its iconic expression in
Justice Marshall's opinion in Dartmouth College v. Woodward: "A
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing
only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it pos-
sesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers
upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. ' 68 The
61. For an excellent treatment of the subject, see Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the
Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHi. L. REV. 1441 (1987).
62. Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation of Willard
Hurst's Study of Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 91-92 (1999).
63. Id. at 91-92, 103-20.
64. Id. at 88-89.
65. Id. at 89.
66. See id. at 92.
67. Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15
DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 292 (1990).
68. 17 U.S. (I Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
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most important characteristic of the artificial entity conception is its
emphasis on the corporation as a creation of the state-a creation that
has special privileges and thus may bear special duties to the
government.
Other, competing views of the corporate entity emerged during the
nineteenth century in response both to economic changes that made
the corporate form more attractive as a business model and to the
boom in state general incorporation statutes, which made this form
available to every businessperson, not just to those able to secure a
special legislative act.69 Although there were various permutations,
the "aggregate theory" cast the corporation as an association of indi-
viduals contracting with each other, rather than an entity created by
and dependent upon the state. 70 This was the dominant view of the
corporation during the latter half of the nineteenth century, although
it by no means completely eclipsed the artificial entity theory in the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence. The aggregate theory was instrumen-
tal in giving the Supreme Court a rationale for extending constitu-
tional rights to the corporate entity.7  This theory attributes
shareholders' rights to the corporation, reasoning that "the courts will
always look beyond the name of the artificial being to the individuals
whom it represents. '72
Finally-at least for our purposes-in the beginning of the twenti-
eth century, another conception of the corporation found its way into
the literature and Supreme Court case law. The "natural entity the-
ory" conceived of the corporation as neither a legal fiction nor an ac-
cumulation of its shareholders' interests. Rather, it argued that a
corporation was "an organic social reality with an existence indepen-
dent of and consisting of something more than its changing sharehold-
ers. . . . [T]he corporation has its own claims, [similar to] natural
69. Hamill, supra note 62, at 104-22.
70. See Mark, supra note 61, at 1457-58.
71. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 67, at 293; Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate "Person": A
New Analytical Approach to a Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 61, 72 (2005).
72. The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 744 (D. Cal. 1882). Justice Field's statement in the
Railroad Tax Cases is representative:
Private corporations are, it is true, artificial persons, but ... they consist of aggregations
of individuals united for some legitimate business .... It would be a most singular result
if a constitutional provision intended for the protection of every person against partial
and discriminating legislation by the states, should cease to exert such protection the
moment the person becomes a member of a corporation.
Id. at 743-44.
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persons, that extend beyond both the circumstances of its legal crea-
tion by the state and the claims or interests of its shareholders. '73
B. Hale v. Henkel: The Court Takes the Expedient Approach
Far from establishing that the Court has adopted a conception of
the corporation that warrants a denial of adversary process, it is evi-
dent from Hale, as well as other constitutional decisions involving cor-
porations, that the Court has never settled long on any one of these,
or other, competing conceptions.74 The Court, as in Hale, has relied
upon the artificial entity theory when determined to deny corpora-
tions constitutional protection, while turning to the aggregation or
natural entity theories when it determined that corporations ought to
be able to claim constitutional safeguards. 75 Its Hale ruling is respon-
sive to practical concerns-such as the needs of law enforcement in
pursuing corporate violators of new regulatory regimes-rather than
any more abstract conceptions regarding the differences in criminal
process applicable to "legal," as opposed to "natural," persons.
The Supreme Court heard argument in Hale in 1906,76 when neither
it nor criminal law enforcement officials had much experience with
issues of corporate criminal investigations or prosecutions. Petitioner
Hale was the secretary-treasurer of MacAndrews & Forbes Company
(M&F), an affiliate of the American Tobacco Company. 77 M&F con-
trolled the sale in the United States of imported licorice, which was an
essential ingredient in the manufacture of tobacco. 78 Independent to-
bacco manufacturers claimed that American Tobacco Company lim-
ited the supply of licorice available to them and, as a consequence,
they paid much more for licorice than did members of the "Tobacco
Trust."'79 "The government sought to ascertain from Mr. Hale, the
Secretary of [M&F], whether these results were brought about by an
agreement, combination or arrangement in violation of the law."'80
Also before the Court was the case of William McAlister, who was the
Secretary of the American Tobacco Company. 81 In his case, the grand
73. Blumberg, supra note 67, at 295.
74. See, e.g., id.; Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking a
Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal Prosecutions, 63
TENN. L. REV. 793 (1996); Krannich, supra note 71; Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal:
Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1990).
75. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
76. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
77. See Henry W. Taft, The Tobacco Trust Decisions, 6 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 377 (1906).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 377-78.
81. Id. at 378.
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jury was investigating whether his company and the Imperial Tobacco
Company, a large British corporation, entered into agreements, inter
alia, to allot all British business to the Imperial Tobacco Company and
all American business to the American Tobacco Company.
82
Enforcement of the Interstate Commerce Act, passed in 1887, and
the Sherman Act, enacted in 1890, had, until the Tobacco Trust litiga-
tion, generally been enforced through the civil remedy of injunction.
Thus, the six trust cases before the Supreme Court from 1895 to 1904
all involved suits for injunctions.83 According to contemporaneous
commentators, the cases shared a more significant characteristic:
In none of those cases was the policy of suppressing the facts re-
sorted to by the defendants, for the reason, probably, that the cor-
porations relied upon the contention that, even conceding that they
had made the agreements, they were not in violation of the law. It
has been mainly since the law has come to be better understood that
notable instances have occurred where great corporations have re-
sorted to obstructive measures which would, if successful, make it
difficult or impossible to procure evidence by which the legality of
their acts may be tested.84
The point of this history is that the Hale Court had no experience with
federal criminal investigations of corporations, nor had the lower
courts wrestled with the issue of what criminal process and rights
ought to control when corporations are the target of such
investigations.
McAlister and Hale were both subpoenaed by the grand jury to tes-
tify and to bring with them corporate documents responsive to a very
broad subpoena duces tecum.85 Both refused to answer questions-
even over a grant of transactional immunity-or to produce the re-
sponsive books and records, and were therefore imprisoned for con-
tempt.86 It was McAlister's and Hale's petitions for writs of habeas
corpus that eventually brought them before the Supreme Court in a
consolidated case. 87
82. Id.
83. See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); Cotting v. Kan. City Stock Yards
Co., 183 U.S. 79 (1901); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); United
States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166
U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (Sugar Trust).
84. Taft, supra note 77, at 377. Indeed, the question of the constitutionality of corporate crim-
inal liability was not settled by the Court until three years after Hale was decided, in New York
Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 499 (1909).
85. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 44-58 (1906).
86. Id.
87. Id.
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McAlister's and Hale's counsel argued first that a federal grand jury
was limited to its common law powers and thus that it could only act
after a bill of indictment had been presented to it; the Court rejected
these contentions after extensive treatment of the relevant authori-
ties.8 8 More important for our purposes was the Court's schizophrenic
treatment of the appellants' final two arguments: (1) that a corpora-
tion, through its agents, could claim a Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination to resist the compelled production of in-
criminating testimonial and documentary evidence; and (2) that the
corporation, through its agents, could claim the Fourth Amendment's
bar on unreasonable searches and seizures when forced by a subpoena
duces tecum to produce corporate books and records. To the first
question, the Court ultimately said "no"; to the second, it answered
''yes."5
One must understand that the Hale Court was operating under the
shadow of its 1886 decision in Boyd v. United States, in which it ruled
that claimants doing business as a partnership were entitled under the
Fourth Amendment to resist the compelled production of certain part-
nership business invoices. 89 That decision came in an in rem forfeiture
action against cases of plate glass allegedly imported in violation of
the revenue laws.90 In Boyd, the Court determined first that the com-
pelled production of documents pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum
is a "search or seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment. 91 The Court went on to hold that "a compulsory production of
a man's private papers, to be used in evidence against him in a pro-
ceeding to forfeit his property," is an unreasonable search and
seizure. 92 In so doing, the Court used the perceived requisites of the
Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination as the criteria for
Fourth Amendment "reasonableness," noting that in "this regard the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other. ' 93 That is,
the Court looked to whether the compelled production would violate
the claimant's Fifth Amendment rights in order to judge the Fourth
88. Id. at 58-66.
89. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
90. Id. at 617.
91. Id. at 622. Only the following portion of Boyd has continuing force:
It is our opinion, therefore, that a compulsory production of a man's private papers to
establish a criminal charge against him, or to forfeit his property, is within the scope of
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, in all cases in which a search and seizure
would be; because it is a material ingredient, and effects the sole object and purpose of
search and seizure.
Id.
92. Id. at 622, 634-35.
93. Id. at 630.
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Amendment reasonableness of the subpoena. In a decision that
would dog the Court's Fifth Amendment analysis for decades-and in
fact haunts it stil194-the Court made the following statement:
[C]ompulsory production of the private books and papers of the
owner of goods sought to be forfeited in [a quasi criminal in rem
forfeiture proceeding] is compelling him to be a witness against
himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Consti-
tution, and is the equivalent of a search and seizure-and an unrea-
sonable search and seizure-within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 95
Boyd has been overruled in every significant doctrinal respect but
one: as the Hale Court reaffirmed, over the government's argument
to the contrary, a subpoena duces tecum is indeed a "search and
seizure" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 96 But the Hale
Court rejected the Boyd Court's analysis for testing whether such a
search or seizure is constitutionally "reasonable." The Court ruled
that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments do not, in fact, run together
but rather are "quite distinct, having different histories, and perform-
ing separate functions." 97 Accordingly, the Court separated the
Fourth and Fifth Amendment analyses. The focus of the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness analysis is not whether the compelled
production of documents would incriminate, but rather whether the
"subpoena duces tecum is.. . too sweeping in its terms to be regarded
as reasonable." 98 As restated in subsequent cases, the Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness test after Hale is whether "the subpoena be suffi-
ciently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive
so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome." 99
Disentangling the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
from the question of Fourth Amendment reasonableness permitted
the Hale Court to split the baby with respect to corporate constitu-
tional rights. In doing so, the Court exhibited a positively schizo-
phrenic understanding of the corporate "person."
Hale is commonly cited for the proposition that the corporation has
no Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. Al-
though its discussion supports this proposition and it is the practical
result of the Court's reasoning, that is not what the Hale Court held.
"The question whether a corporation is a 'person' within the meaning
94. See, e.g., United States v. Hubbel, 530 U.S. 27, 49 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
95. Boyd. 116 U.S. at 634-35.
96. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76-77 (1906).
97. Id. at 72.
98. Id. at 76.
99. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541. 544 (1967).
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of [the Fifth Amendment] really does not arise," the Court stated, be-
cause the "[t]he Amendment is limited to a person who shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.' l00 "The
right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to incriminate
himself is purely a personal privilege of the witness"; thus, "[i]t was
never intended to permit him to plead the fact that some third person
might be incriminated by his testimony, even though he were the
agent of such person." 101 In short, because the grants of immunity
had removed Hale's and McAlister's personal Fifth Amendment
rights, and because they could not assert the right of a third party,
they could not assert whatever rights their corporate principal could
claim. Because a corporate entity can never lumber into the grand
jury room, smokestacks steaming, to assert the Fifth, the practical im-
port of the Hale decision is that the corporation lacks a Fifth Amend-
ment right.
Is the Court's ruling unassailable? It is not, and this precedent,
fairly viewed, is vulnerable in a number of respects. The Hale Court
was on firm ground in asserting that a witness cannot rely on the con-
stitutional rights of another to shield herself. 102 It was on much shak-
ier ground, however, in saying that an agent cannot assert the
privilege of a principal. Lawyers regularly do so, as do corporate
agents, without objection by the Supreme Court. Indeed, in Hale, the
Supreme Court upheld the right of these self-same agents to assert the
Fourth Amendment rights of their corporate principals over the objec-
tion of Justice Harlan. In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan took
the position that a corporation has no Fourth Amendment right to
assert and also noted that the witnesses' "personal rights, let it be ob-
served, were in no wise involved in the pending inquiry" and thus
could not be used to resist disclosure; Harlan concluded that "[i]t was
not [the witness's] privilege to stand between the corporation and the
Government in the investigation before the grand jury.' 10 3
The Hale Court's conception of the corporation may have had some
sway in the Fifth Amendment result, but, given the Court's treatment
of the corporation for Fourth Amendment purposes, it is more likely
that these theories simply allowed the Court to dress up results-driven
holdings in convenient metaphors. For Fifth Amendment purposes,
the predominant metaphor was the artificial entity conception of the
100. Hale, 201 U.S. at 70 (emphasis in original).
101. Id. at 69-70.
102. See, e.g., Mitchell Lewis Rothman, Life After Doe? Self-Incrimination and Business Doc-
uments, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 387, 403 (1987).
103. Hale, 201 U.S. at 78 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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corporation. Indeed, the Court's reasoning in this respect is such a
wonderful explication of this conception that it is worth quoting at
length:
[Tihe corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be
incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special
privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the
State and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by
law.... It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a State, having
chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not
in the exercise of its sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had
been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand
the production of the corporate books and papers for that pur-
pose .... While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incrimi-
nating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does
not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and
franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse
of such privileges. 10 4
Just two paragraphs after the above exegesis, however, the Court took
a drastic turn by relying on the aggregate theory to recognize that a
corporation could claim the Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasona-
ble searches and seizures:
[By denying the corporation the benefit of the Fifth Amendment],
we do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not
entitled to immunity, under the Fourth Amendment, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an
association of individuals under an assumed name with a distinct
legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no
constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its property
cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded
against by due process of law, and is protected, under the Four-
teenth Amendment, against unlawful discrimination. Corporations
are a necessary feature of modern business activity, and their aggre-
gated capital has become the source of nearly all great
enterprises.10 5
It is important to note, for purposes of assessing the strength of the
Hale result, that four Justices disagreed with the Court's decision to
"split the baby." Justice Harlan's concurring opinion expressed his
belief that corporations could claim neither the Fourth nor the Fifth
Amendment. In aid of this belief, he relied on the artificial being con-
ception: "[A] corporation-'an artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law'-cannot claim the immu-
nity given by the Fourth Amendment; for, it is not part of the 'People,'
within the meaning of that Amendment. Nor is it embraced by the
104. Id. at 74-75 (majority opinion).
105. Id. at 76 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
[Vol. 57:329
DOJ PRIVILEGE WAIVERS
word 'persons' in the [Fifth] Amendment."'1 06 Justice McKenna wrote
a separate concurrence, arguing that subpoenas duces tecum should
not be treated like search warrants for purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment. 0 7 Although, for this reason, McKenna did not have to reach
the question of whether corporations can claim Fourth Amendment
protection, he noted that "[t]here are certainly strong reasons for the
contention that if corporations cannot plead the immunity of the Fifth
Amendment, they cannot plead the immunity of the Fourth
Amendment." 0 8
Justice Brewer, in dissent, argued on behalf of himself and the Chief
Justice that the corporation should have the benefit of both the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments. 0 9 His analysis was founded in part on prece-
dents finding that corporations are "persons" with rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment; thus, he reasoned, corporations must also be
"persons" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 10 Further,
the Court, having found that corporations are "citizens" of a state for
purposes of federal court jurisdiction, Brewer argued that it could no
less deny that these entities are part of the "people" granted Fourth
Amendment rights."' As could be expected, he relied upon the aggre-
gate theory.' 1 2
What, then, accounts for the Court's Fifth Amendment holding?
Many have pointed to passages in the Hale opinion that indicate that
the Court's decision was dictated by pure practical exigency. 13 For
example, after concluding that appellants, as agents, could not assert
the rights of their corporate principal for Fifth Amendment purposes,
the Hale majority reasoned as follows:
As the combination or conspiracies provided against by the Sher-
man Anti Trust Act can ordinarily be proved only by the testimony
of the parties thereto, in the person of their agents or employees,
106. Id. at 78.
107. Id. at 82 (McKenna, J., concurring).
108. Id.
109. Hale, 201 U.S. at 83-89 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 84-85.
111. Id. at 85-86.
112. Id. at 86.
[A corporation] is essentially but an association of individuals, to which is given certain
rights and privileges, and in which is vested the legal title. The beneficial ownership is
in the individuals, the corporation being simply an instrumentality by which the powers
granted to these associated individuals may be exercised. As said by Chief Justice Mar-
shall ... : "The great object of an incorporation is to bestow the character and proper-
ties of individuality on a collective and changing body of men."
Id. (quoting Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 U.S. (1 Pet.) 514, 562 (1830)).
113. See, e.g., Rothman, supra note 102, at 394 (arguing that the Hale decision "is animated
almost entirely by social control concerns").
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the privilege claimed would practically nullify the whole act of Con-
gress. Of what use would it be for the legislature to declare these
combinations unlawful if the judicial power may close the door of
access to every available source of information upon the subject? 1 14
This reading seems correct.
The Court was unconvinced that such practical imperatives con-
trolled with respect to corporate claims to Fourth Amendment protec-
tion, even though such claims were made by the government and were
argued by Justice Harlan in concurrence. In particular, Harlan argued
that, if the corporation is given a Fourth Amendment right, "the
power of the Government by its representatives to look into the
books, records, and papers of a corporation of its own creation, to
ascertain whether that corporation has obeyed or is defying the law,
will be greatly curtailed, if not destroyed."11 5 Yet Justice Harlan failed
to note that the Fourth Amendment, unlike the Fifth, is a conditional
right. What is barred is the unreasonable search and seizure of private
property, and the Court adopted in Hale a view that the constitutional
"reasonableness" of grand jury subpoenas no longer was tied to the
Fifth Amendment and concerned only whether the subpoena was suf-
ficiently limited, defined in terms of temporal and subject-matter limi-
tations on the volume of the document production. In short, the
Court denied corporations the unqualified Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination and accorded it the protections of the condi-
tional Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. This was a very law-enforcement friendly means of splitting
the baby, but it is not one that is grounded in any consistent view of
what constitutes a corporate "person" for constitutional purposes or,
by extension, any belief that corporations are not entitled to the nor-
mal adversarial process of U.S. justice.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY
Hopefully, the above has persuaded readers of a number of circum-
stances, which the author at least believes to be incontestable: (1) the
balance of power between defense and prosecution in corporate crime
cases heavily favors the government; (2) this flows from a number of
factors, including an overbroad and vague criminal code, an overly
generous standard of criminal liability, onerous and diverse corporate
penalties upon conviction, and the lack of a corporate Fifth Amend-
ment privilege; (3) the forced "waiver" issue that has so consumed the
debate is the "last straw," which accounts for its high profile in the
114. 201 U.S. at 70.
115. Id. at 78 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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literature but perhaps distracts from what should be the principle fo-
cus of policymakers and legislators-that is, the source of the felt
compulsion to waive rather than the consequences of such waivers; (4)
if, that is, they conclude that the existing failure to provide corporate
defendants the benefits of the adversarial system is problematic.
This Article attempts to redirect the debate from its current fixation
on privilege waivers to the real issue: should the current state of af-
fairs in corporate criminal investigation-that is the current imbalance
in power-be redressed, and, if so, how? This Article does not at-
tempt to comprehensively answer those questions in these pages but
offers a few preliminary observations below.
First, if the answer to the appropriate treatment of corporations in
criminal law lies in theories of corporate "personhood," the appropri-
ate paradigm to be applied in this context would be the aggregate the-
ory. Because the predominant standard of liability, respondeat
superior, does not take any account of the corporate entity's culpabil-
ity as an organization, but only looks through the entity to the conduct
of the individuals, this seems logical. It also seems fair, given the dras-
tic consequences that corporate criminal liability can have for the vari-
ous aggregations of persons associated with it.
Second, regardless of how one conceptualizes an organizational de-
fendant, the logic of our system would seem to demand that corpora-
tions be accorded the same process as individuals:
The central precept of adversary process is that out of the sharp
class of proofs presented by adversaries in a highly structured foren-
sic setting is most likely to come the information from which a neu-
tral and passive decision maker can resolve a litigated dispute in a
manner that is acceptable both to the parties and to society.116
Why does this "central precept" not apply as much to corporations as
to individuals? The author, at least, has heard no convincing rationale
for a distinction in this regard.
116. Stephan Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System, 44 OHIo
Sir. L.J. 713, 714 (1983). There are, of course, those who argue that the adversary system is, for a
variety of reasons, not the best way of resolving controversies. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Melilli,
Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REV. 669; Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 5 (1996). Many participants in the federal criminal justice system, including
former prosecutors, argue that if the system was ever adversarial, it is not so today in individual
as well as corporate cases. See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal
Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998). With plea rates consistently hovering at around 95%,
it is difficult to argue with Judge Lynch when he asserts that "the American system as it actually
operates in most cases looks much more like what common lawyers would describe as a non-
adversarial, administrative system of justice than like the adversarial model they idealize." Id. at
2118. That said, this Article obviously emphasizes cases involving the investigation of alleged
corporate criminality.
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Third, even if one were to accept that adversity is an overrated vir-
tue in the case of a corporate subject or target, presumably some pro-
cess is appropriate through which a disinterested evaluator may
review prosecutorial choices. The alternative system of criminal jus-
tice most familiar to American readers is the so-called "inquisitorial"
system, which is employed in many parts of Europe.1 17 Yet, if corpo-
rations are not privy to anything approaching truly adversarial process
in criminal proceedings, they also do not receive the institutional safe-
guards built into an inquisitorial system of justice.
It is difficult to make generalizations about the conduct of all in-
quisitorial systems, but they often share procedural features that are
designed to arrive at a fair, impartial "truth," largely without adver-
sarial testing. It is the investigation, not the trial, that is the heart of
the truth-finding process in inquisitorial systems, and one of the im-
portant features of the investigation is the role of prosecutors and in-
vestigating magistrates in gathering both inculpatory and exculpatory
evidence. Rather than looking to prevail in a contest with the defen-
dant, their commitment is principally a bureaucratic one-to find out
all the facts, let the chips fall where they may, with the object of hav-
ing a neutral judge ultimately sort out the allocation of criminal re-
sponsibility. There will be layers of bureaucrats investigating,
supervising the investigation, and reviewing the investigative results.
"The number of official participants in the multi-stage investigation,
each subject to supervision, is an inherent check on the [prosecutor's]
power to make independent decisions. Moreover, as civil servants
working within a bureaucratic hierarchy, inquisitorial investigators
have no reason to be partial and indeed are expected to be impar-
tial." 1 8 In many civil law systems, prosecutors have, at least in theory,
no discretion in charging; if they believe that a serious crime has been
committed, they must bring it to the attention of the investigating
magistrate. Even if a defendant elects to confess or tries to plead
guilty, in many civil law systems that does not conclude the inquiry. A
trial-albeit a much more informal one than is the norm in the United
States-is required in every case, because the state's commitment is to
satisfy itself as to the guilt of the defendant.
117. In the interests of illustrating my point briefly and concisely, I will ignore for the moment
the existence of other paradigms and the objections of commentators that the line between these
two systems is cloudy and that the characterizations are often misapplied.
118. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons from
Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 200-01
(2004).
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Federal prosecutors in the United States are said to have a dual
obligation: to be both zealous advocates and agents of justice.1 19 But
there is no good explanation for prosecutors' "do justice" obligation
that does not, in the end, depend heavily upon the notion that prose-
cutors should do what is "right" in their minds, and what is "right" is
heavily influenced by the adversarial contest in which they are en-
gaged. Given prosecutors' adversarial orientation and training, they
are not suited to conduct the type of neutral investigation that is at
least theoretically the hallmark of "inquisitorial" justice systems. As
Professor Geraldine Szott Moohr concluded in comparing U.S. fed-
eral prosecutors with their counterparts in France, "[U.S.] federal
prosecutor[s are] freer to act on any unconscious bias that can result
from a close association with the investigation .... On the whole, the
inquisitorial prosecutor, while explicitly in charge of the inquiry, exer-
cises less discretion and has less power than the federal prosecutor
investigating white collar crimes.' 20
Certainly U.S. federal prosecutors have no obligation to search for
exculpatory evidence, no obligation to turn over whatever they find in
the course of their investigation until a trial is certain, and only the
barest of obligations under reigning Supreme Court case law at that
point. Once a defendant is charged, the prosecutor's job, as it is gen-
erally conceived, is to convict her. Prosecutors in the United States
can bring their considerable discretion in charging, as well as all the
coercive powers discussed above, to bear on a defendant in order to
secure guilty pleas; the plea rates in federal court, which hover around
95%, attest to this reality.12a Once a defendant elects to plead guilty,
the only "process" to which she is entitled is a plea hearing, at which a
judge ascertains that the plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Although judges may ask a defendant to "allocute," that is, to concede
guilt, there is no judicial "trial" or even a cursory review of evidence.
In sum, corporate subjects and targets of criminal investigations can
claim the protections of neither adversarial nor inquisitorial justice to
have their criminal liability impartially and reliably tested. 122 This sta-
tus quo is quite simply unacceptable in a country that prides itself on
the rule of law and the fairness of its criminal justice processes. It is
also unacceptable for reasons sounding in justice and efficiency.
119. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE Standard 3-1.2(b) (3d ed. 1993).
120. Moohr, supra note 118, at 201.
121. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 33, available at http://www.
ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006/chap5 06.pdf (95.7% in 2006).
122. Moohr, supra note 118, at 201.
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These reasons may be self-evident but are rarely acknowledged by the
government in its efforts to press corporations into a "crime-fighting
partnership."
First, it should go without saying that, as strong as the public inter-
est is in enabling the government efficiently and effectively to allocate
its investigatory resources to fight corporate criminality, it is certainly
not the only value worth considering. It must be acknowledged, al-
though it almost never is, that not every government investigation is
worthy and not every theory of corporate liability is sound. Criminal
statutes commonly applied in white-collar cases are often vaguely
worded and elastic in their application. This indeterminancy in many
of the most frequently invoked white-collar statutory provisions
means that the question in many white-collar cases is not what the
defendant did, but rather whether what the defendant did was a
crime. 123 If prosecutors are able to "roll" corporations on any theory
at all-whether or not what actually happened is or should be deemed
a crime under the statute-the law, public, and innocent corporate
constituencies suffer.
Prosecutors, by selecting theories of prosecution, and judges, by re-
sponding to them, have essentially created a common law of federal
crime, which gives substance to the vague words of the U.S. Code.
The public interest in having a reasonably understandable set of crimi-
nal prohibitions, then, is unequivocally served by empowering corpo-
rate counsel to resist the government's attempts to pressure a plea and
to have a meaningful opportunity to have an impartial arbiter test the
viability of prosecutorial legal theories.
Finally, as harmful as corporate crime may be in any number of
respects, the harm of an overzealous or unwise prosecution is also
great. The stakes in corporate crime cases are often very high, mea-
sured both in terms of dollars and the effect that criminal or regula-
tory action can have on the livelihood and lives of countless innocent
persons, including blameless employees and shareholders. Professor
John Coffee summarized the "flow-through" effects of a corporate
prosecution best: "[a]xiomatically, corporations do not bear the ulti-
mate cost of the [criminal sanction]; ... put simply, when the corpora-
tion catches a cold, someone else sneezes. This overspill of the
penalty initially imposed on the corporation has at least four distinct
levels, each progressively more serious": penalizing shareholders,
bondholders and other creditors, employees, and even consumers.1 2 4
123. O'SULLIVAN, supra note 27, at 43-44.
124. John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386, 401-02 (1981).
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V. CONCLUSION
The DOJ's waiver policy is the last straw in the death of adversity in
corporate crime cases. It provides a convenient target for the defense
bar and one upon which defense counsel, whose cause is not always a
political winner, may be able to enlist the help of the many lawyers in
Congress. But do not be distracted by what is ultimately a symptom
of a much larger malady. It is the death of adversity-and the many
circumstances that have created the felt compulsion for corporations
to forgo resistance-that ought to be the focus of critical inquiry and
public policy debate.
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